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Abstract—Network coding is an elegant technique where,
instead of simply relaying the packets of information they receive,
the nodes of a network are allowed to combine several packets to-
gether for transmission and this technique can be used to achieve
the maximum possible information flow in a network and save the
needed number of packet transmissions. Moreover, in an energy-
constraint wireless network such as Wireless Sensor Network
(a typical type of wireless ad hoc network), applying network
coding to reduce the number of wireless transmissions can also
prolong the life time of sensor nodes. Although applying network
coding in a wireless sensor network is obviously beneficial, due
to the operation that one transmitting information is actually
combination of multiple other information, it is possible that
an error propagation may occur in the network. This special
characteristic also exposes network coding system to a wide
range of error attacks, especially Byzantine attacks. When some
adversary nodes generate error data in the network with network
coding, those erroneous information will be mixed at intermeidate
nodes and thus corrupt all the information reaching a destination.
Recent research efforts have shown that network coding can be
combined with classical error control codes and cryptography
for secure communication or misbehavior detection. Nevertheless,
when it comes to Byzantine attacks, these results have limited
effect. In fact, unless we find out those adversary nodes and
isolate them, network coding may perform much worse than
pure routing in the presence of malicious nodes. In this paper,
a distributed hierarchical algorithm based on random linear
network coding is developed to detect, locate and isolate malicious
nodes. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first one
in the literature that proposes a distributed intrusion detection
and isolation scheme to effectively conquer Byzantine attacks for
Random Linear Network Coding in a wireless network.
Index Terms—Random Linear Network Coding, Byzantine
attacks, intrusion detection, network coding, wireless sensor
network, locating, watchdog.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Network Coding
Network coding has become a paradigm shift in information
transmission, it is first brought up by Prof. Shuo-Yen Robert
Li et al [1]. Instead of traditional information transmission
method, storing and forwarding, network coding allows inter-
mediate nodes to mix received information together and trans-
*This paper is also published in the open access journal:International
Journal of Distributed Sensor Network
mit new information generated by the received information in
terms of encoding. Due to encoding operation at intermediate
nodes, data can be regarded as information flow through
network, which is in a sense of data compression. Therefore
throughput and bandwidth efficiency can be increased and
delay can be decreased also via network coding. In [1],
Prof. Shou-Yen Robert Li has showed that network capacity
with network coding can be bounded by min-cut max-flow
theory, which is larger than traditional storing-and-forwarding
method.
B. Random Linear Network Coding
Recent research’s having proven throughput gain of network
coding in variety of application makes network coding an
attractive topic. With algebraic approaches, such as [2], a
communication pattern with network coding of a network can
be designed and achieve its promised capacity, which is the
min-cut from the source to the sinks in a network graph [1].
However, algebraic approaches require much central informa-
tion and optimized coding scheme is actually not practical to
design at most time [3]. Then a distributed method of network
coding has been developed Random Linear Network Coding,
shorted as RLNC [4]. RLNC is a powerful tool to disseminate
information in networks for it is distributed and robust against
dynamic topology. Without knowing central information such
as network topology, RLNC regards every encoded packet as a
coding vector over a finite field Fq and generates new packets
at intermediate nodes by linearly combining received packets
with random coefficient. Some overhead in packet’s header is
introduced to record how packets are combined (in [4], it is
called global encoding vector) and sinks can do decoding and
recover original information as long as they retrieve enough
packets.
C. Security issue of network coding
Network coding shows its variety of possibilities and benefit
in information dissemination, however, it also introduces new
type of security issue. The most serious security challenges
posed by network coding thus seem to come from various
types of Byzantine attacks, especially packet-modifying attack.
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In particular, RLNC has been shown very robust to packet
losses induced by node misbehavior [5]. Nevertheless, when
it comes to packet-modifying attack, RLNC has become quite
vulnerable. In RLNC, one intermediate nodes will linearly
combine received packets and generate new packets to next
multiple receivers. If this node has been compromised and gen-
erates error packets, other nodes received those error packets
will also be modified for those error packets will stay in buffer
and keep being combined with normal packets. Hence, nodes
of each path these error packets go through would become new
compromised nodes without self-awareness and disseminate
more error packets. In other word, the error due to modified
packets will propagate in network with RLNC. Eventually, the
whole communication network may be crushed just because of
one single adversary node. Fig. 1 shows how a single adversary
node propagates error.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II illustrates
pros and cons of related works on Byzantine attacks, Section
III describes our model and algorithm, Section IV gives the
simulation results and analysis, Section V shows mathematical
analysis. Section VI concludes the paper with a summary of
the results and discussion of further work.
II. RELATED WORK
Existing method mostly modifies the format of coded packet
against Byzantine attacks, and can be divided into two main
categories: (1) misbehavior detection, and (2) end-to-end error
correction.
A. Misbehavior Detection
Misbehavior detection applies error control technique or
information-theoretic frameworks of encryptography to detect
the modification introduced by Byzantine attackers. By types
of nodes who take care of coding burden, misbehavior detec-
tion can be further divided into generation-based and packet-
based. Generation-based detection takes similar advantage as
error-correcting codes and lays expensive computation tasks on
destination nodes. As long as enough information is retrieved
by destinations, modification can be detected. [6] proposes
an information-theoretic approach for detecting Byzantine
modification in networks employing RLNC. Each exogenous
source packet is augmented with a flexible number of hash
symbols that are obtained as a polynomial function of the
data symbol. This approach depends only on the adversary not
knowing the random coefficient of all other packets received
by the sink nodes when designing its adversarial packets.
The hash schemes can be used without the need of secret
key distribution but the use of block code forces an priori
decision on the coding rate. Moreover, the main disadvantage
of generation-based detection schemes is that only nodes
with enough packets from a generation are able to detect
modifications and thus, result in large end-to-end delays.
On the contrary to generation-based detection schemes,
packet-based detection schemes allow intermediate nodes in
the network detecting modified data on the fly and drop
modified packets instead of only relying on destinations,
Fig. 1. Error propagation due to modifying packets by Byzantine nodes in
a network with RLNC
which is more suitable for high attack probability compared
to generation-based detection schemes. Packet-based detection
schemes require active participation of intermediate nodes with
ability to compute hash function or generate signature based
on homomorphic hash functions [7], [8]. Hash of a coded
packet can be easily derived from the hashes of previously
encoded packets; in that way, intermediate nodes can verify
validity of encoded packets before linearly combining them.
This characteristic also prevents from error propagating in
network. Unfortunately, homomorphic hash function is also
computationally expensive and can’t be used in inter-session
network coding scenario while different sources combine their
own source information together.
B. End-to-end Error Correction
End-to-end error correction schemes include error cor-
recting code method into the process of encoding packets
and sinks can correct error and recover original information
under certain amount of error. Like generation-based detec-
tion schemes, end-to-end error correction schemes lay all
encoding and decoding tasks on sources and sinks, such that
intermediate nodes are not required to changer their mode
of operation. The transmission mode for end-to-end error
correction schemes with network coding can be described by
matrix channel Y = AX + Z, where X is the matrix
whose rows are the source packets, Y corresponds to the
matrix whose rows are received packets at sinks,A denotes the
transfer matrix, which records linear transformation operated
on packets while they traverse the network, also called global
encoding vectors, and Z describes the matrix according to
the injected error packets after propagate over the network.
With error-correcting code, we can recover X from Y . [9],
[10] and [11] discuss performance of error correction ability
while some channel information, such as loss rate or error
probability, is known. [12] proposes a simple coding schemes
with polynomial complexity for a probabilistic error model of
random network coding and provides bounds on capacity. [13]
provides a special coding method, which adds a zero vector in
the transmitted packet at the source node with assumption that
there is a secret channel between source nodes and sink nodes
to inform sinks where the zero vector locates in the trans-
mitted packet. This information can’t be seen by intermediate
nodes and it will be very useful while Byzantine attackers
maliciously modify the transmitted packet. As a matter of
fact, under some modification level, the more modification,
the more likely sinks can recover the original information
by using information from observing modified zero vectors.
[13] also gives bounds on capacity for two adversarial mode:
when Byzantine attackers have limited eavesdropping ability,
optimal rate would be C-z; when Byzantine attackers can
eavesdrop all links, optimal rate would be down to C − 2z,
where C is the network capacity and z is the number of
links controlled by attackers. With special error-correcting
code, sinks can be more tolerant with errors, but this scheme
also introduces large overhead in packets which result in
tremendous transmission efficiency decreasing.
Even though end-to-end error correcting schemes can re-
cover original information at sinks, it can’t stop error from
propagating and introduces large overhead (in worst case, only
1
3 of a packet carries data); misbehavior detection schemes can
intercept modified packets on the fly to prevent errors from
propagating, but it unfortunately takes expensive computation
complexity. We will propose a new type of network coding
packet and a distributed algorithm to locate Byzantine attack-
ers and then isolate those nodes. Our algorithm essentially
control the error propagation over the network and is not
computationally expensive. Detailed introduction is in the next
section.
III. NETWORK MODEL AND BYZANTINE ATTACKERS
A. Network Model with RLNC
Consider a wireless network of n nodes with commu-
nication range of r randomly distributed in a square area,
represented by an undirected graph G = (V,E), with | V |= n
nodes. Let d(i, j) denotes the distance from node i to node j.
An edge eij ∈ E when d(i, j) ≤ r. Besides, these n nodes
have the ability to access the information of their position.
Without loss of generality, we assume the lower left corner of
the square area to be the origin and each nodes know their
coordinate such as (3, 4).
In the communication pattern in which we are interested,
each node can perform RLNC to disseminate messages. One
source S trying to multicast k messages {m1, . . . ,mk} to
d destinations {D1, . . . , Dd} transmits those messages as
vectors of bits which are of equal length u, represented as
elements in the finite field Fq , where q = 2u.The length of the
vectors is equal in all transmissions and all links are assumed
to be synchronized with a global clock splitting time into slots
or rounds which are common to all nodes tin the network.
In each time slot, nodes with messages in buffer send out
new messages on edges to other nodes simultaneously. Let
Si(t) = {f1, . . . , f|Si(t)|} be the set of all messages at nodes
i at time slot t, and by definition, for fl ∈ Si(t), 1 ≤ l ≤
|Si(t)|, fl ∈ Fq and fl =
∑n
u=1 αlumu, αlu ∈ Fq . When a
node i sends out a message , this message is actually a liner
combination, called local encoding, of the messages stored in
node i with payload gi,out ∈ Fq , where
gi,out =
∑
fl∈Si(t)
βlfl, βl ∈ Fq;Pr(βl = β) = 1
q
,∀β ∈ Fq
The vector β = [β1, . . . , β|Si(t)|] is called local encoding
vector, and the message gi,out can be further written as
follows.
gi,out =
∑
fl∈Si(t)
βlfl =
∑
fl∈Si(t)
βl
k∑
u=1
αlumu
=
k∑
u=1
|Si(t)|∑
l=1
βlαlu
mu = k∑
u=1
γumu,
where γu =
∑|Si(t)|
l=1 βlαlu ∈ Fq and the vector γ =
[γ1, . . . , γk] is called global encoding vector. The global
encoding vectors are transmitter over the network for decoding
and we define our transmitted packets as Fig. 2 to assure that
coefficients γu are recoded and nodes know that.
B. Threat Model and Our Algorithm
We propose an algorithm, Distributed Hierarchical Adver-
sary Identification and Quarantine, to fight against packet-
modifying attack introduced by compromised Byzantine
nodes. Assume z0 out of n nodes has been compromised
as Byzantine nodes and they will modify every packet they
send out in order to crash the whole network transmission.
Specifically speaking, these Byzantine nodes modify the global
encoding coefficients or payload of newly generated outgoing
messages, which result in error due to that the modified
vectors may not belong to the vector space spanned by source
messages and further propagate the errors by following linear
combinations of other nodes. We seek an algorithm to locate
these Byzantine nodes and isolate them, so that they cannot
affect the network.
As mentioned above, network coding is susceptible to
the packet-modifying attacks for errors will propagate by
operation of linear combinations. However, our algorithm,
DHAIQ, uses this characteristic to let error propagate within
a certain range in order to let some chosen nodes, referred as
watchdogs, detect that there are some Byzantine nodes in the
monitored area. Before starting our algorithm, we assume that
node density and is known by every nodes from operating
other algorithm such as aggregate computation. DHAIQ can
mainly divided into 5 steps:
1) When a network is under packet-modifying attacks, an
arbitrary node in the network will trigger the whole
algorithm. This node is the watchdog of the 1st level.
This first watchdog will awake the 2nd level’s four
watchdogs and pass two messages, which are node
density and the monitoring area size. The node density
is a criterion of termination scheme and the whole
deployment area is the 2nd level’s monitoring range
as figure 3(a) illustrates. The awaken watchdogs are
chosen by locations. These four watchdogs are situated
in each corner of their common monitoring area. After
awaking the 2nd level’s watchdogs, the first watchdog
ends its monitoring mode and turns back to its normal
mode.
2) Each of the 2nd level’s watchdogs will generate its own
special packet, referred as probe packet. It then sends
this probe packet to the other three watchdogs in an
area-restricted flooding way as described in figure 3(b).
Except for these watchdogs, every node that receives
these packets will do encoding and then sends new
packets to all its neighbors. These packets will be lin-
early combined via intermediate nodes and constrained
to disseminate within the monitoring range. This is all
determined at the 2nd level. There are four watchdogs
and obviously four different probe packets which are
in the same generation. The packets belonging to the
same generation will start and terminate transmitting
simultaneously based on a time stamp. Any node that
receives the probe packets the first time will record
this time stamp. Nodes will continue encoding and
sending out packets until the time stamp is expired. If
a probe packet reaches a node outside the monitoring
range, this node will drop that packet. The information
carried by probe packets only traverse in the monitoring
range. With the time stamp, all nodes that belong to
the same monitoring area can terminate transmitting
simultaneously. Before the termination of monitoring, all
watchdogs keep retrieving packets from other nodes and
keep a packet pool in their buffer. An arriving packet is
called innovative packet only if it is linear independent to
each packets stored in a watchdog’s buffer. The discard
rule is to keep innovative packets and drop all non-
innovative packets. In this way, we also can limit buffer
size to a pretty small value. There will be only four
packets if there’s no adversary node in the monitoring
area. Watchdogs also keep computing the rank of vector
space spanned by buffered packets until this generation
is expired.
3) If there is any adversary node in the monitoring areas,
errors would propagate in the monitoring area and
some of the watchdogs would receive modified packets
with high probability. Watchdogs can judge whether
they receive modified packets by the rank of packet
pools. For example, one can say that there is at least an
adversary node located in the monitoring area when a
watchdog has a packet pool of rank 5. As soon as any
of watchdogs detects the existence of adversary nodes,
that watchdog will notify the other watchdogs in the
same generation and trigger the next level’s watchdogs
together as shown in figure 3(c). These four watchdogs
Fig. 2. The practical format of transmitted packets
will divide their common monitoring rang into four
sub-areas by their corners discussed previously. Each
watchdog can then duplicate what the first watchdog
does in step 1). Each of them awakes four arbitrary
nodes in its corresponding sub-area and pass node
density and next level’s monitoring range, which is a
quarter of a current monitoring range according to the
location of the upper level’s watchdog. The awaken
four nodes will also approximately locate at each corner
of the sub-area and there will be a total of sixteen
watchdogs awaken for four sub-areas of the next level
(3rd level) as displayed in figure 3(d).
4) Repeat step 2) and step 3), keep dividing the areas in
a distributed way until we can locate adversary nodes
in a small enough area. We define this ”small enough
area” by the number of nodes locating in it. When the
number is small and under a threshold λ, we terminate
the monitoring of this area. The number of the node in
an area can be estimated by the information of node
density and monitoring range which are carried by
probe packets. Therefore this ”small enough area” will
be the least monitoring area we can divide. In the least
monitoring area, it is very possible that an adversary
node is chosen as a watchdog. In this case, adversary
nodes may realize this is the time to temporarily act
normal and stop modifying the contents of packets. The
detection will fail due to adversary nodes’ temporary
good behaviors. Any detection in progress will be
terminated if its monitoring range is under the threshold
and all the nodes in this area will be marked as suspect
nodes.
5) After some random time intervals, another arbitrary
node will trigger the algorithm again and this time its
monitoring range will be shifted by a short distance.
In the very end of the algorithm, we will mark some
small squares which contain adversary nodes. If we shift
the monitoring range a little in the beginning of the
algorithm, the squares we choose will not be identi-
cally overlapped but partially overlapped. This partially
overlapped area may contain adversary nodes with high
probability and the other non-overlapped areas, which
may contain normal nodes but remarked as suspect,
would be less suspicious. In this way, we can eliminate
the number of nodes who are marked as suspects but
in fact are normal nodes, referred as innocent nodes. To
get the final result, each node in the network maintains a
suspect table. Whenever a node is reported as a suspect,
its suspect level in the other nodes’ tables increases by
1. The nodes with high suspect level will be regarded
as adversary nodes and isolated. Our simulation results
show this shift scheme can greatly reduce the amount
of mistaken nodes.
(a) The first watchdog awakes
watchdogs of next level.
(b) Watchdogs of next level start
sending out probe packets.
(c) One watchdog detects errors
and notifies the others.
(d) Each watchdog further
awakes more watchdogs of next
level.
Fig. 3. Hierarchical division of the monitoring areas.
IV. ANALYSIS AND SIMULATION RESULT
A. Probe packets and time stamp
In most scenarios of RLNC application, the destinations do
the decoding as long as they receive full rank of packets.
In our algorithm, we modify this scheme that destinations
don’t decode to fit our requirements. Considering the worst
case, to detect an adversary node is that all watchdogs gather
around the center of the monitoring area and the adversary
node is located at the very edge. Based on the flooding
method, the least time slot required for watchdogs to receive
modified packets is the hop number of the shortest path
from the adversary nodes to the watchdogs, which is half
diagonal of the monitoring area. Since the source of modified
packets also come from watchdogs, the average number of
hop for a modified packet to arrive the watchdogs is
√
2k.
Note that k is the node number of current monitoring area,
which is accessible information for watchdogs. We can set
time stamps of each generation with this number
√
2k to
assure that watchdogs can receive modified packets and trigger
the next level whenever there are Byzantine nodes. When a
time stamp is expired, its corresponding nodes will terminate
disseminating packets and empty their buffer.
B. Range of shifting
Simply repeating the algorithm won’t perform better since
the sub-areas are equally divided. If the algorithm starts with
the same monitoring area, it will eventually lead to the same
result and be in vain. Thus we shift the starting monitoring
area in order to minimize the number of innocent nodes. Now
the question is how many we should shift each time. It is
straightforward to see that if we shift more than a single least
monitoring area, this shift is useless. Hence we know the shift
range should be no larger than the length of edge of the least
monitoring area.
The purpose that we use shift scheme is to further divide
the least monitoring area into smaller areas so that we can
eliminate the number of innocent nodes. To this end, we shift
in both horizontal and vertical directions to let overlapped
areas divide the least monitoring area into four smaller areas.
Hence the question has become how to divide these four
smaller areas in order to get the least innocent nodes. Basically
we have two options here, equal division and non-equal
division. In fact, the equal division method will have the least
expected value of innocent nodes. The mathematical analysis
is in section V, and the simulation results also support our
idea.
C. Innocent nodes and overhead
When we mark the nodes in the least monitoring area
as suspect nodes, we mark all the nodes in the area. In
fact, some nodes are normal nodes but marked as suspect,
and we call them innocent nodes. Consider the case which
we only perform identification algorithm once without using
suspect table. It is straightforward that uniform distribution of
Byzantine nodes can lead to the worst result with the most
innocent nodes. The ratio of innocent nodes is upper bounded
by
(µ− 1)z0
n
and this bound grows linearly with respect to
the number of Byzantine nodes and µ, which is quite a large
number. Besides, probe packets carry no data information and
the amount of probe packets transmitted of all generations in
each level is O(n
√
n). In one identification algorithm, it will
trigger O(log n) levels totally and therefore total number of
transmitted probe packets is O(n
√
n log n) in time O(
√
n).
D. Simulation Results
In our simulation, we uniformly distribute 400, 600 ,800
and 1000 nodes in a square area with width of 800 and node
communication range is 50. We simulate our algorithm under
the circumstance of the amount of adversary nodes varying
from 5 to 45 and these adversaries are uniformly and normally
distributed. Fig. 4 is the first result of our algorithm, we can
see that the innocent ratio of uniform distribution pattern is
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Fig. 4. Innocent ratio and Byzantine catch ratio for two different distribution
pattern of adversaries
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Fig. 5. Innocent ratio and Byzantine catch ratio with shift scheme
quite high. The uniform distribution pattern is the worst case
to our algorithm. In order to decrease the amount of innocent
nodes, we introduce shift scheme. The result are shown in Fig.
5. The result with more nodes is in Fig. 6. As we can see,
our algorithm performs better in a dense topology. Performing
shift scheme in our algorithm can eliminate innocent ratio
effectively, but it also drags down the catch ratio a little bit.
Because shift scheme also generates holes around boundaries,
which can not be detected sometimes. The result shows that
the catch ratio only drops a little, which is an acceptable value.
V. ANALYSIS
The shift scheme aims to further divide the least monitoring
areas into smaller areas so that we can decrease the number
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Fig. 6. Results for more nodes
of innocent nodes. With it, the final results of marked areas in
each run of algorithm will be different. The overlapped marked
areas are smaller than the least monitoring areas and contain
less innocent nodes. Considering the case that overlapped areas
divide a least monitoring area A into four smaller areas, A1,
A2, A3 and A4. The expectation number of innocent nodes
will reach a minimum value while A1 = A2 = A3 = A4. We
now prove our claim.
Claim The expectation value of number of innocent nodes
will reach a minimum when the least monitoring area A is
divided into four equal areas.
Proof: Assume that the area A is of size 1 and divided
into four areas, A1, A2, A3 and A4, with the area size of a1,
a2, a3 and a4. We have a1 + a2 + a3 + a4 = 1 and a1, a2,
a3, a4 > 0. The least monitoring area A has µ nodes totally
and k of the µ nodes are adversary nodes. Clearly k < µ
The expectation number of innocent nodes is
E(k) =[1− (1− a1)k]a1µ+ [1− (1− a2)k]a2µ+
[1− (1− a3)k]a3µ+ [1− (1− a4)k]a4µ
=(a1 + a2 + a3 + a4)µ−
[a1(1− a1)k + a2(1− a2)k + a3(1− a3)k + a4(1− a4)k]µ
=µ− [a1(1− a1)k + a2(1− a2)k + a3(1− a3)k + a4(1− a4)k]µ.
We want to have E(k) ≥ some constant c, so the problem
becomes
maximize x1(1− x1)k + x2(1− x2)k + x3(1− x3)k + x4(1− x4)k
subject to x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 = 1.
We denote f(x) = x1(1−x1)k+x2(1−x2)k+x3(1−x3)k+
x4(1−x4)k and h(x) = x1+x2+x3+x4−1. By the Lagrange
condition, we have
(1− x1)k−kx1(1− x1)k−1 + λ = 0
(1− x2)k−kx1(1− x2)k−1 + λ = 0
(1− x3)k−kx1(1− x3)k−1 + λ = 0
(1− x4)k−kx1(1− x4)k−1 + λ = 0
x1+x2 + x3 + x4 = 1.
Obviously, the solution to theses equations is
x1 = x2 = x3 = x4 =
1
4
and λ = (
k
4
− 3
4
)(
3
4
)k−1
Thus x∗ = [ 14 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ]
>.
Now we need to resort to the second-order sufficient con-
ditions to determine if the problem reaches a maximum or
minimum at x1 = x2 = x3 = x4 =
1
4
. Let l(x, λ) =
f(x)+λ>h(x) and L(x, λ) be the Hessian matrix of l(x, λ).
We can find the matrix
L(x∗, λ) = F(x∗) + λH(x∗)
=

g(k) 0 0 0
0 g(k) 0 0
0 0 g(k) 0
0 0 0 g(k)
 ,
where g(k) = (
3
4
)k−2(
k − 7
4
). On the tangent space M =
{y | y1 + y2 + y3 + y4 = 0}, we note that
y>Ly = y21(
3
4
)k−2(
k − 7
4
) + y22(
3
4
)k−2(
k − 7
4
)+
y23(
3
4
)k−2(
k − 7
4
) + y24(
3
4
)k−2(
k − 7
4
) < 0,
for k < 7 and all y 6= 0.
Thus L is negative definite on M when k < 7 and f
reaches a maximum. In our algorithm, we set our µ = 5,
and k < µ obviously. Therefore, we can always reach a
minimum expectation value in our setup and it happens at
a1 = a2 = a3 = a4 =
1
4
.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK
We have proposed a locating algorithm in appliance of
RLNC to locate compromised Byzantine nodes in a network.
Our algorithm can locate the areas in where adversary nodes
locate with some normal nodes being mistaken as adversary
nodes. To reduce the number of mistaken nodes, we use a shift
scheme to eliminate the probability of being mistaken. The
simulation results show that our algorithm performs well in
Guassian distribution pattern for adversary nodes. In the worst
case, uniform distribution pattern for adversary nodes, we
still can locate most adversary nodes and reduce almost 10%
of mistaken ratio by shift scheme. We also gives discussion
about the best policy for shift scheme. Fixing the shift range
to the half length of the least monitoring area has the best
performance.
Even though we do locate the areas where adversary nodes
lie, but there still exist mistaken nodes. A second stage algo-
rithm is required in order to precisely identify each adversary
node. Sampling each node one by one in the most suspicious
area or combining some special coding scheme with our
algorithm may be a worthy researching direction.
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